In 2003, an anonymous plaintiff ("John Doe") filed suit in federal court against Kamehameha Schools, claiming that its 117-year-old admissions policy favoring indigenous Hawaiian children "discriminates" against non-Hawaiians in violation of federal civil rights law.
3 John Doe's attorneys called the policy "categorical racial exclusion" and "segregation. They conjured up infamous images of George Wallace "standing in the schoolhouse door to prevent the admission of qualified children simply because they have the wrong skin color and bloodline. ", 5 Native Hawaiians, on the other hand, decried the distortion of "civil rights" to deny indigenous Hawaiians' claims to self-education and governance. For them, Kamehameha Schools offered no special privileges or "racial preferences," but instead provided a form of self-determination: "We're not asking for a handout; we're asking to be able to take care of our own." 6 For
Hawaiians, the Schools afforded a measure of restorative justice "for a... people in their own homeland who are suffering."
7
In December 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, decided Doe v. Kamehameha Schools.' An eight-judge majority upheld the private schools' admissions policy and rejected the contention that the Schools discriminate in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a post-Civil War civil rights statute aimed at uplifting freed Black slaves from two hundred years of systemic subordination. 9 The majority opinion, authored by Judge Susan Graber, recognized that indigenous Hawaiians face a multitude of ills traceable to the onset of Western economic and political control of the Hawaiian Islands.° The court also noted that Kamehameha Schools serve to counteract the severe and systemic educational disadvantages facing Native Hawaiians today.
II With a firm grasp of Native Hawaiian history and context, the majority concluded that "Congress intended that a preference for Native Hawaiians, in Hawai ['] i, by a Native Hawaiian organization, located on the Hawaiian monarchy's ancestral lands, be upheld because it furthers the urgent need for better education of Native Hawaiians, which Congress has repeatedly identified as necessary."
12
The private trust of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, the last direct descendant of Hawai'i's first king, created the Kamehameha Schools in 1883, nearly fifteen years before the United States annexed Hawai'i. The princess created the trust to uplift Hawaiian children through education because the forces of Western encroachment had nearly decimated the Hawaiian people and foreshadowed the American takeover of the Hawaiian government. The princess sought not to exclude non-Hawaiians by labeling them inferior or unworthy (a classic civil-rights violation) but rather to rebuild her own people (an act of restoration and self-determination). 3 Princess Pauahi Bishop had witnessed the decimation of Hawai'i's indigenous population-from a conservative estimate of 400,000 at the time of first European contact in 1778 to less than 45,000 a century later. 14 In the face of accelerating American military and plantation economic control of the Hawaiian islands and the continuing loss of Hawaiian life and destruction of Hawaiian culture, the Princess dedicated her royal land 12. Id. at 849. Moreover, the court stated, "Because the Schools are a wholly private K-12 educational establishment, whose preferential admissions policy is designed to counteract the significant, current educational deficits of Native Hawaiian children in Hawai ['] i, and because in 1991
Congress clearly intended § 1981 to exist in harmony with its other legislation providing specially for the education of Native Hawaiians, we must conclude that the admissions policy is valid under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." Id.
In its analysis, the court adopted a modified three-step Johnson inquiry to determine "whether a wholly private K-12 educational institution's remedial admissions policy is valid." Id. at 841 (referring to the test in Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) ). It thus held that: (1) Kamehameha Schools showed that "specific, significant imbalances in educational achievement currently affect Native Hawaiians in Hawai ['] i and that the Schools aim to remedy that imbalance"; (2) the Schools' admissions policy does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-Native Hawaiians because students denied admission to the Schools have ample alternative educational options, and as Congress expressly recognized, "in the unique context of Native Hawaiian history, affirmative measures are needed to address present, severe inequalities in educational achievement"; and (3) the Schools' policy changes "as the capacity of the Schools' programs increases and as the well-being of the Native Hawaiian community rises, the policy does no more than is necessary in light of the significant educational imbalances that Native Hawaiians continue to face." Id. at 844-46.
In a concurring opinion, in which four other judges joined, Judge William Fletcher suggested an alternative analysis. He concluded that "Congress has invariably treated 'Native Hawaiian' as a political classification [rather than merely a racial one] for purposes of providing exclusive educational and other benefits. Under the special relationship doctrine, Congress has the power to do so. I see nothing in § 1981 to indicate that Congress intended to impose upon private institutions a more restrictive standard for the provision of benefits to Native Hawaiians than it has imposed upon itself." Id. at J., concurring Bernice Pauahi Bishop, by founding the Kamehameha Schools, intended to establish institutions which should be of lasting benefit to her country ....
And so, in order that her own people might have the opportunity for fitting themselves for such competition, and be able to hold their own in a manly and friendly way, without asking any favors which they were not likely to receive, these schools were provided for, in which Hawaiians have the preference, and which she hoped they would value and take the advantages of as fully as possible.
Id. (quoting Charles Reed Bishop's 1889 speech (citation omitted)).
16. See S.J. Res. 19, 103d Congress, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993 . 40 (1999) ). In 1895, the beloved former Queen Lili'uokalani was imprisoned for misprision of treason. Her sentence was commuted in 1896.
19. See LILIKALA KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E POND Ai? 305 (1992) (account of characterization of Hawaiians as "ignorant Natives"); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAI'I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW 139 (2000) ("paternalistic racism" characterized Native Hawaiians as "childlike, benign, and foolish"); NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE TO AMERICAN COLONIALISM 51-54, 59-61, 72-73 (2004) (Hawaiians were characterized as "lazy," "savage," "barbaric," "degraded," "ignorant," "incompetent" and "inferior").
20. See NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 26-30 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 1991) . [Volume 14:205 bore a cultural, economic and spiritual connection. 21 Beyond the Hawaiian Islands, American colonialism spread worldwide during this era, reaching new heights in 1898 with U.S. territorial acquisitions of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam.22 This form of American "westernization" hastened the near-demise of indigenous Hawaiians, resulting in a present-day native Hawaiian population that bears the worst socio-economic indicators of Hawai'i's people with the highest rates of serious illness, prison incarceration and homelessness, and the lowest rates of higher education attainment and 21 family income.
Indeed, Congress's Apology Resolution of 1993 acknowledged this and commanded the President to apologize for the United States' active role in the "conspiracy" to illegally overthrow the internationally-recognized Hawaiian government and for the ensuing "devastation" of the Hawaiian people. 24 The Apology Resolution also recognized that the "indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their national lands to the United States. In the first brief, the 'Ilio'ulaokalani Coalition sets forth a persuasive historical argument in support of Kamehameha Schools' admissions policy. It describes the special responsibility under Hawaiian custom and tradition of the ali'i, or chiefs, to care for others, and argues that Kamehameha Schools serve to fulfill those same responsibilities to the Hawaiian people. Looking also to the history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the brief asserts that § 1981 does not apply because Kamehameha Schools' policy was created, as an act of self-determination, while Hawai'i was a sovereign nation and outside the ambit of the United States Constitution. The private, charitable educational institution receives no federal funding and was created with the private lands of a pre-existing sovereign to address the 27. Id. at 1172. Judge Kay declared that it "would be ironic indeed if a [civil rights] law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice [(slavery) In the third brief, the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, Native Hawaiian Bar Association, and Na 'A'ahuhiwa argue that Kamehameha Schools' policy is a "political" classification rather than a "racial" one because the United States has a special trust obligation to Native Hawaiians as an indigenous people. It contends that Congress also expressly recognized this special relationship when it created a number of programs for the benefit of Native Hawaiians and was fully aware of this special relationship when it reenacted § 1981 in 1991.
Finally, the Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission brief argues that the § 1981 analytical framework developed to remedy civil rights violations is inappropriate to examine the unique history of Native Hawaiians and their distinct claims. It contends, first, that restorative programs, like Kamehameha's, are based on the political rather than the racial status of Native Hawaiians. Second, the brief argues that the Weber-Johnson standards were erroneously applied because Kamehameha Schools' policy is not a race-based affirmative action program. Affirmative action programs seek equality and integration, while Kamehameha Schools' policy seeks to restore the self-determination of a formerly sovereign indigenous people.
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF THE 'ILIO'ULAOKALANI COALITION IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING

I. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus Curiae 'Ilio'ulaokalani Coalition (hereafter 'Ilio'ulaokalani) respectfully submits this brief supporting the petition for rehearing en banc by Appellee Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate ("Kamehameha Schools"). 'Ilio'ulaokalani is a grassroots organization comprised of kumu (master teachers) and loea (cultural experts) whose purpose is to link and apply traditional Hawaiian cultural principles, practices and skills to effect educational, social, environmental and economic change for the betterment and advancement of Hawaiians and the community at large. 'Ilio'ulaokalani is committed to preserving and protecting Hawaiians' traditional way of life and ancestral rights.
'Ilio'uolakani is responsible for protecting the interests of Kamehameha Schools' intended beneficiaries (whether admitted or not), by ensuring that the trust is implemented in accordance with Hawaiian customs and traditions.* Kamehameha Schools' admissions preference is an expression of self-determination by and for Hawaiians, involving uniquely indigenous interests, such as land, membership, self-government, and culture.
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The unique historical context of the Hawaiian Islands raises exceptionally important questions justifying en banc rehearing of this case. Beyond the extensively documented (and undisputed) facts below, this Court should consider the historical circumstances surrounding the formation of Kamehameha Schools.
As the embodiment of an ali'i (chiefs) trust, Kamehameha Schools fulfills special responsibilities owed under Hawaiian custom and tradition. The trust is both a Hawaiian asset and an expression of self-determination, which should not be constrained by applying a civil rights statute that: * expressly did not apply at the time Ke Ali'i Bernice Pauahi Bishop's will was created (1883/1884); and * has never before been enforced against a private, charitable educational institution that receives no federal funds, and which (a) was formed using the private lands of a pre-existing sovereign, (b) serves native peoples, and (c) addresses the remedial needs of its intended beneficiaries.
III. ARGUMENT
Historical context must not be ignored when analyzing racial discrimination claims. others." 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (footnote omitted). Traditionally, both the ali'i (chiefs) and the maka'dinana (commoners) possessed corresponding duties to care for the land, rather than ownership of it. Upon uniting the islands, Kamehameha I concentrated the greatest responsibilities amongst his most trusted advisors (Ali'i Nui). During the transition from communal to private ownership (Mahele), the King obtained title to 2.5 million acres of land, 1 million of which he retained personal ownership and 1.5 million of which he granted to the government. Of the total 1.6 million acres granted to a combined 245 individual ali'i, the majority of this land was granted to 10 Ali'i Nui. Both the King and the ali'i demonstrated that they believed they owned legal title on behalf of the people who owned equitable title. Besides recognizing that the people held a one-third interest in the land,' the King, government, and ali'i always took title to the land "subject to the rights of tenants"-i.e., the people. 2 RLH, at 2152.2 In addition, the Kuleana Act recognized commoners' rights to take needed resources from ali'i lands. 2 RLH, at 2142.
As Westerners came to control most of the Kingdom's land and native people were dying off, the ali'i trusts (King Lunalilo, Queen Emma, Princess Pauahi, and Queen Lili'uokalani) reinforced traditional Hawaiian obligations. Those who had no children willed their lands to siblings and cousins in turn, with the bulk passing to Ke Ali'i Ruth Ke'elikolani. When Princess Ke'elikolani died on May 24, 1883, she conveyed 353,000 acres to her cousin Pauahi. Because she was the last of the main Kamehameha line, Pauahi put these lands, along with smaller amounts inherited from her parents and others, into a trust "for the school dedicated to the education and upbringing of Native Hawaiians. " Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000) . In other words, the Kamehameha Schools were established as a private educational institution, pursuant to a charitable testamentary trust, by "a true Hawaiian" seeking to uplift "her own people" for "lasting benefit to her country. More specifically, Kamehameha Schools is an expression of selfdetermination by and for Hawaiians, consistent with their rights as the Indigenous peoples of Hawai'i. Like other Indigenous peoples, Hawaiians' inherent sovereignty pre-dates the U.S. Constitution and thus is "unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978 ). Cf Wabol v. Villacrusis, 908 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1990 ) (upholding racial restriction on alienation of land "in view of the importance of the ownership of land for the culture and traditions of the people of the Northern Mariana Islands ... and to promote their economic advancement and self-sufficiency"). For analogous reasons, the integrity of [Volume 14:205 Hawaiian assets vital to their culture and traditions (including, but not limited to, the Kamehameha Schools) should not be constrained by blind application of § 1981.
Instead recognized that the government could not violate property rights by altering the Dartmouth College charter contrary to its founders' intent. Although Dartmouth was decided under Article I, section 10 of the Constitution (the contract clause) as applied to states, almost two hundred years later, this court owes no less of an obligation to Pauahi to: * "most seriously examine" her intent (id. at 630-31); " ensure the "perpetual application" of the trust property "to the objects of its creation" (id. at 641); and, " refrain from "subverting" a most sacred contract between Pauahi and her people. Id. at 653. As explained by Justice Story, forced redistribution of private assets unlawfully interferes with contract and property rights:
If a grant of land or franchises be made to A., in trust for special purposes, can the grant be revoked, and a new grant thereof be made to A., B., and C., in trust for the same purposes, without violating the obligation of the first grant? ... The common sense of mankind will teach us, that all these cases would be direct infringements of the legal obligations of the grants to which they refer; and yet they are, with no essential distinction, the same as the case now at the bar. Id. at 711-12 (J. Story, concurring). The Panel majority's ruling is precisely the type of forced redistribution of private assets found unconstitutional in Dartmouth College, effectively redistributing Pauahi's property from her intended "objects" and beneficiaries-the Hawaiian people-to Doe.
The Kamehameha Schools do not "trammel" the rights of others. Instead, they perpetuate the ali'i legacy in accordance with cultural customs, traditions, and identities-to the detriment of no one, but to the benefit of our multi-cultural nation as a whole.
C. CONTEXT MATTERS: HISTORICAL CONDITIONS SURROUNDING THE FOUNDATION OF KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS
By failing to acknowledge significant historical conditions surrounding the creation of Pauahi's will, the Panel majority obscures an irony apparent to all who know Hawai'i's history. Notwithstanding United States recognition of Hawai'i's independence between 1826 and 1893, this period was marked by a continuing process of accommodation to and struggles with foreigners over land, religion, and sovereignty. An underlying current of racist beliefs contributed to a public discourse of "enlightened" civilization and salvation through labor, as compared with demeaning characterizations of purportedly "lazy," "savage," "barbaric," "degraded," "ignorant," "incompetent," and "inferior" native people. ALOHA BETRAYED, [51] [52] [53] [54] [59] [60] [61] Amidst this struggle, a Hawaiian nationalist press emerged in the 1860s to express pride in Hawaiian language and culture, while countering the colonial argument that "progress" meant becoming more like Americans or Europeans. Id. at 54-86 & 95. Hawaiian language publications of mo'olelo (stories), mele (songs), hula (dance) and mo'oka'auhau (geneaologies), represented conscious attempts to retain a sovereign identity. Id. at 66.
Nevertheless, the 1887 "Bayonet Constitution"-signed under threat of violence-resulted in an oligarchy under which wealthy white resident aliens could vote, but working class Hawaiians and Asian immigrants could not (also removing provisions concerning the inviolability of Crown lands).
3 Id. at 126-28; see also Ralph S. Kuykendall, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM: 1874-1893, at 370 (1967) (noting that the Bayonet constitution "reduced the Hawaiians to a position of . . . actual inferiority in the political life of the country") (emphasis added). Hawaiian subjects responded by petitioning their last King and Queen to reinstate former constitutional provisions. However, the oligarchy seized upon the Queen's (aborted 4 ) efforts to respond to her subjects as an excuse for the illegal overthrow in 1893.
Four years later, more than half (between 21,000 and 38,000) of the total Hawaiian population (about 40,000) signed petitions used to defeat a proposed Treaty of Annexation in Congress. ALOHA BETRAYED, at 124, 149 & 151. However, Congress nevertheless annexed Hawai'i via Joint Resolution during the 1898 Spanish-American War.
Kamehameha Schools address the devastating impacts of these actions, in part, by seeking to restore the importance and value of Hawaiian culture, language and identity. Thus, the "irony" of applying § 1981 is even greater than the District Court identified. 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1164-65. Considered against the historical context presented above, Kamehameha Schools' Native Hawaiian preference clearly does not violate § 1981. 
AMICUS BRIEF OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE OF HAWAI'I-HONOLULU CHAPTER, CENTRO LEGAL DE LA RAZA, AND THE EQUAL JUSTICE SOCIETY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES' PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
INTEREST OF AMICI
The Japanese American Citizens League of Hawai'i, Honolulu Chapter (JACL), seeks protection of civil and human rights regardless of race, creed, color, national origin, or sex.
Centro Legal de la Raza advances the rights of low-income and Spanish-speaking communities, and empowers the community to assert its rights in order to create a just and fair society for everyone.
The Equal Justice Society (EJS) is a national organization of scholars, advocates and individuals advancing innovative legal strategies and public policy for enduring social change.
ARGUMENT
I. KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS' ADMISSIONS POLICY DOES NOT VIOLATE CIVIL RIGHTS; RATHER, IT SERVES TO RESTORE TO NATIVE HAWAIIANS THAT WHICH 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY "WESTERN INFLUENCE" NEARLY DESTROYED: HAWAIIAN EDUCATION, CULTURE AND A MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNANCE.
As non-Hawaiian civil rights organizations, amici JACL-Hawai'i, Centro Legal de la Raza, and the Equal Justice Society write to say that the Kamehameha Schools admissions policy favoring Hawaiian children does not transgress civil rights. We have seen the harsh reality of racism and have fought hard for equal justice under law. African-Americans suffered slavery, segregation and present-day discrimination in jobs and housing. Asian-Americans and Latinos faced racialized immigration exclusion, alien land and anti-miscegenation laws, the internment and current treatment as perpetual foreigners. We have experienced the pain of civil rights violations. And we can say that the Kamehameha Schools admissions policy is not about unfair treatment based on race.
Doe's suit is not, as some suggest, about trying to end a program comparable to Jim Crow segregation in the South. Rather, the suit is about an effort to break apart a successful educational program by Hawaiians as "childlike, benign, and foolish"). [Volume 14:205 Hawaiian language was barred from the schools. Plantations diverted water from agrarian Hawaiian communities. More Hawaiians were separated from the land, severing cultural, economic and spiritual connections. See NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED (2004) .
This form of American "westernization" hastened the near-demise of indigenous Hawaiians. Indeed, Congress held hearings on the "Rehabilitation and Colonization of Hawaiians," recommending the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1921 as restorative justice for a "dying race." 2 Hawaiians in their homeland still bear the worst socioeconomic indicators of all Hawai'i's people-the highest rates of illness, prison incarceration and homelessness, and the lowest rates of higher education and family income. Congress' Apology Resolution of 1993 acknowledged this and commanded the President to apologize for the U.S.'s active role in the "conspiracy" to illegally overthrow the internationally-recognized Hawaiian government and for the ensuing "devastation" of the Hawaiian people. S. Joint Res. 19, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993 .
The Kamehameha Schools admissions policy thus is not about violating civil rights, denigrating one group as inferior to justify better treatment of another. As Judge Kay highlighted in finding a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for the Schools' policy, the School is about a private self-determining effort of restoration for Hawai'i's first people. 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1169, 1172.
II. IN ASSESSING AN INDIGENOUS GROUP'S ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE A MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNANCE AND CULTURE THROUGH EDUCATION IN THE FACE OF OVERWHELMING "WESTERN INFLUENCE," THE COURT'S INQUIRY INTO "LEGITIMATE NONDISCRIMINATORY REASONS" MUST INCORPORATE THE CONTEXT OF COLONIZATION AND ITS RESULTING "DEVASTATION" OF THE NATIVE PEOPLE.
For these reasons, international human rights principles of selfdetermination and restoration for indigenous peoples illuminate the "remedial legitimacy" of the Kamehameha Schools admissions policy. See 1987) ). But, as Judge Kay below recognized, strict application of WeberJohnson's private employment remedy criteria is starkly inappropriate for assessing an indigenous group's attempts to repair through self-education the "devastation" and continuing harms of accelerating "Western Influence," or colonialism-which in 1898 included worldwide U.S. territorial acquisitions of not only Hawai'i but also the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Guam. 3 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1165-66 (strict adherence to the ''narrow lens" of employment diversity affirmative action "forces the inquiry to ignore the unique historical context which surrounds Kamehameha Schools, a private educational institution.").
S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous
In assessing whether an indigenous group's response to the Congressionally acknowledged "devastation" constitutes a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason," the Court cannot tightly limit its inquiry, as the panel did, to whether a challenged program effectively excludes other groups. Slip op. at 8950-51. Instead the Court must ask if the indigenous program's use of race or ancestry is "legitimate" in that it does not denigrate other racial groups (treating them as racially inferior or uncivilized) and, most important, is crafted as a restorative response to colonialism's devastation.
That very inquiry lies at the heart of Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) , in which the Supreme Court found a Native American blood preference to be a "political" restorative measure (even though race was involved) and therefore legitimate. Id. at 554 n.24. The fact that the indigenous hiring practice there excluded other racial groups was not determinative. Indeed, race/ancestry had to be an integral factor in the political restoration process because race/ancestry had been key originally in the U.S.'s justification for the confiscation of land, the creation of guardian-ward reservations, and the destruction of culture and selfgovernance (the savage and uncivilized natives had to be conquered and then watched over 325 (1998) . 4 Although Mancari addressed a constitutional challenge, its foundational inquiry into legitimate reasons is directly relevant here.
The majority in this case, however, in its narrow assessment of "legitimate reasons," entirely omitted this analysis. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg have acknowledged the import of this analysis in assessing Native Hawaiian programs. Rice, 528 U.S. at 533-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (self-determination and "compensat[ion] for past wrongs" principles require considering indigenous ancestry). 5 Scholars worldwide also acknowledge its salience. International scholar, Albert Memmi, a Tunisian Jew and resister of French colonialism, incisively describes colonization as political "aggression" (taking land and resources and controlling indigenous populations) that is often partially justified through "race."
Since the aggressor portrays itself as civilized and law-abiding, it needs a mechanism for justifying to its people and the world its bald political take-over of another country and its people. For Memmi, "racism" in this setting is not simple ignorance or skin color prejudice.
Rather, it is characterizing people as "different," less worthy or less human "others" (threatening, uncivilized, inferior) to make political "aggression" for economic or military reasons appear necessary.
Given this reality, indigenous political efforts to rectify the devastation of colonization must address race or ancestry as part of the restoration process. This is the jurisprudential foundation for the Supreme Court's Mancari decision-regardless of whether the indigenous group is 7 Mancari referred to formally recognized "Indian tribes" as "political" minorities. 417 U.S. at 554. An indigenous group's lack of formal government recognition, however, does not undercut the import of Mancari's foundation for assessing "legitimate" reasons under § 1981. See also Kamehameha Sch., slip op. at 8963-67 (Graber, J., dissenting) (citing many Congressional remedial acts based on the special relationship between the U.S. and Hawaiians even without formal recognition). [Volume 14:205 
I. INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici, Native Hawaiian organizations dedicated to ensuring the continued existence of Hawaiian rights and programs, respectfully submit this brief in support of Kamehameha Schools' Petition for Rehearing En Banc.
Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation is a public interest, non-profit law firm that asserts and defends Native Hawaiian rights to lands and resources, beneficiary rights under public and private Hawaiian trusts, and rights to sovereignty and self-determination. Native Hawaiian Bar Association is an association of lawyers and legal professionals of Hawaiian ancestry that strives for justice and effective legal representation for all people of Hawaiian ancestry. Na 'A'ahuhiwa is an association of retired Native Hawaiian judges organized to advise and advocate on issues affecting Native Hawaiians and Hawai'i.
Amici have a common interest in supporting the legitimate beneficiary structure of the Kamehameha Schools trust. Kamehameha has many programs that serve the entire community, but its Hawaiian ancestry preference for admission to the Schools is based on the wishes of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, who created the charitable trust supporting the Schools. This preference also recognizes that the lands of the trust were the lands of the ali'i (high chiefs) of the Kingdom of Hawai'i, who understood that they held these lands not in a "fee-simple" Western sense, but as trustees, with a fiduciary obligation to the Hawaiian people. See Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 65 Haw. 531, 548 n.14, 656 P.2d 57, 68-69 n.14 (1982) (ali'i in ancient Hawaiian thought similar to trustee).
Those tracing their genealogy to Hawai'i's indigenous people are thus the beneficiaries of these lands in a direct sense and are entitled to a preference for the limited openings at Kamehameha Schools. They have entitlements to the benefits that flow from this charitable trust similar to rights of heirs and beneficiaries of any other estate. The majority ruling, if allowed to stand, would have the effect of radically and detrimentally altering the rights of these Native Hawaiian beneficiaries. Thus Amici urge this Court to grant rehearing en banc and reverse the majority decision of the panel.
II. ARGUMENT
A. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER
KAMEHAMEHA'S ADMISSIONS POLICY RELIES ON A "POLITICAL" OR "RACIAL" CLASSIFICATION Whether Kamehameha's admissions policy employs a political classification, rather than a racial one, is an issue that is properly before, and should be considered by, this Court en banc. Kamehameha's Petition for Rehearing, at 7-9, and the Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the State, at 9-12, fully address the issue of whether Kamehameha conceded that its admissions policy was based solely on race and those arguments will not be reiterated here. It is important to note, however, that from the beginning of this lawsuit Kamehameha has argued that the policy does not discriminate on the basis of race. In answer to the complaint, and in the amended answer, Kamehameha admitted the "preference in its admissions policy for children of Hawaiian ancestry" but clearly asserted that "its admissions policy does not discriminate on the basis of race." Answer 2, 20 (7/16/03); Amended Answer 2, 21 (9/24/03).
Kamehameha has consistently relied on the status of Native Hawaiians as indigenous peoples in assessing the validity of the admissions policy. See Petition for Rehearing at 8 n. In the district court and in this Court, Kamehameha relied on Congress's determination that benefits are extended to Native Hawaiians not "because of their race, but because of their unique status as the indigenous people of a once sovereign nation as to whom the United States has established a trust relationship." 20 U.S.C. § 7512(12)(B) (education); 25 U.S.C. § 4221 note (housing). See, e.g., Transcript of Argument, 11/4/04, at 30; Mem. in Support of Defendants' Motion for S.J. at 27-28.
Even if Kamehameha had conceded that its admissions policy was a racial classification, "[when an issue or claim is properly before [a] court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law." Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) . This Court can, and should, "consider an issue 'antecedent to ... and ultimately dispositive of the dispute before it, even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief." US. Nat 'l Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents ofAm., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993) .
Consequently, even if not "discretely" identified, the legal question of whether the admissions policy is based on a political or racial classification is "inextricably linked" to the question of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and thus should be appropriately resolved by this Court in an en banc rehearing. See City of Sherrill. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 125 S. Ct. 1478 , 1490 n.8 (2005 ; see also Ballard v. CI.R., 125 S. Ct. 1270, 1275 n.2 (2005) (addressing "a question anterior to all other [issues] the parties raised" even though "the parties did not discretely refer to the ground on which our decision rests").
B. KAMEHAMEHA'S ADMISSIONS PREFERENCE RELIES ON A "POLITICAL" CLASSIFICATION
Kamehameha's admissions preference is based on a "political" [Volume 14:205 classification rather than a "racial" one, because the United States has recognized repeatedly that it has a political relationship with and a special trust obligation to Native Hawaiians as the indigenous people of Hawai'i.' See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7512(12); 42 U.S.C. § 11701(18)-(2). Courts have accepted for decades that preferences for Native Americans are subject only to rational-basis judicial scrutiny, because they are based on a "political" classification rather than a "racial" classification. This results from the unique political relationship between the United States and natives, even when the native groups are defined by genealogy or ancestry. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977) . Under this approach, courts review special treatment of natives only to determine whether the programs are "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation" toward the native group. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. This Court recently applied rational-basis review to laws excluding Native Hawaiians from applying for federal tribal recognition, explicitly accepting the argument that "the classification is politically based." Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271 , 1278 (9th Cir. 2004 . That decision emphasized that Congress was entitled to treat Native Hawaiians under separate and distinct legislation because of "the unique history of Hawai'i," Id. at 1281-82, explaining that it was entirely understandable that "Congress has established a program of federal benefits and entitlements for native Hawaiians that is different" from those for other native groups. Id. at 1282.
If this Court has concluded that the classification between Native Hawaiians and other Native Americans is a "political" classification and that courts should defer to Congressional determinations regarding the different programs established for different native groups, then it necessarily follows that the admissions policy of a school established when the Kingdom of Hawai'i was a co-equal sovereign of the United States should also be evaluated under rational-basis review applicable to political classifications. The majority opinion however, engaged in no such analysis, summarily concluding that Kamehameha acknowledged the admissions policy to be a racial classification.
Kamehameha may have acknowledged that genealogy or ancestry is a component of the admissions policy, but that is certainly not the same as acknowledging that it utilizes a "racial" classification. Classifications
There is no question that Native Hawaiians are indigenous people. The Supreme Court in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) , acknowledged repeatedly that Native Hawaiians are indigenous people by referring to them as "the native population," id. at 506, and "the native Hawaiian population," id. at 507.
involving native peoples frequently involve a genealogical, ancestral, or "racial" component, but they are nonetheless characterized as "political."
This judicial acceptance of the "political" classification is best demonstrated by examining Mancari. The Mancari preference was not free of "racial" components, because an individual had to have "one fourth or more degree Indian blood" to qualify for the preference. 417 U.S. at 554, n.24. The Supreme Court was thus dealing with a mixed political/racial category, but it nonetheless concluded that "rational-basis" review should apply because the prominent feature of this category was the "political" relationship between the native people and the United States.
The majority in this case relied heavily on the Indian tribal affiliation noted in the Mancari decision. Slip op. at 8956. But the Supreme Court's decisions after Mancari demonstrate that the Court itself did not view Mancari in the same restrictive light. In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) and United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) , the Court upheld, under rational-basis review, benefits and legislation affecting individual Indians not organized into formal tribes.
Weeks involved a statute distributing assets to the heirs of two recognized tribes, but the heirs receiving benefits did not themselves have to be tribal members. 430 U.S. at 82, n.14. Without making any special comment on the fact that benefits went to nontribally-affiliated individuals, the majority opined that Congress was free to "expand a class of tribal beneficiaries entitled to share in royalties from tribal lands." Id. at 84. The John decision ignored the supposedly crucial distinction between tribal and nontribal Indians, applying rational-basis review to Congressional action establishing separate criminal laws for Mississippi nontribal Indians who were a mere "remnant of a larger group of Indians" that had moved to Oklahoma. 437 U.S. at 653.
This Court applied the Mancari rational-basis standard in Alaska Chapter, Associated General Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982 , in upholding a Congressional program allowing preferences to all "Indian organizations and Indian-owned economic enterprises" (without regard to tribal membership) bidding on HUD contracts.
Based on these long-established precedents, the Kamehameha admissions preference must be viewed as one that utilizes a "political" rather than a "racial" classification, not implicating 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
C. CONGRESS HAS RECOGNIZED THE UNIQUE STATUS OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS AND 42 U.S.C. § 1981 SHOULD BE HARMONIZED WITH CONGRESSIONAL POLICY
Judge Graber's dissent points out that the 1866 Civil Rights Act was enacted while "the Hawaiian Islands were still a sovereign kingdom," Slip op. at 8963, and that when Congress reenacted this statute in 1991 it was [Volume 14:205 cognizant of the laws enacted in the interim, including Congress's explicit approval of the important role Kamehameha has played in educating Hawaiian children and protecting Hawaiian culture. Id. at 8964. She explained, "the inescapable conclusion from the statutory context is that in 1991 Congress intended that a preference for Native Hawaiians, in Hawaii, by a Native Hawaiian organization, located on the Hawaiian monarchy's ancestral lands, be upheld because it furthers the urgent need for better education of Native Hawaiians." Id. at 8966. (emphasis added).
The majority, however, dismissed the importance of the many statutes Congress has passed recognizing the special trust relationship between Native Hawaiians and the U.S. Id. at 8953; id. n.10. The majority recognized that its duty was to interpret "what Congress may do and has done," id. at 8953, but it nonetheless refused to do just that. Even while acknowledging the many Congressional preferential enactments for Native Hawaiians, id. at 8957-60,2 the majority refused to recognize their legal significance.
Although Congress has chosen to treat Native Hawaiians differently from other Native Americans, Congress has clearly determined that separate and preferential programs for Native Hawaiians are consistent with their "unique status as an indigenous people of a once sovereign nation." 20 U.S.C. § 7512(12)(B). In accord with that determination, Congress recently established the Office of Native Hawaiian Relations within the Secretary of Interior's office to implement the "special legal relationship between the Native Hawaiian people and the United States" and "continue the process of reconciliation with the Native Hawaiian people." Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004 , 118 Stat. 3, div. H, § 148 (2004 .
Had the majority been willing to interpret "what Congress may do and has done," it should have harmonized Congressional policy recognizing the political status of the Native Hawaiian people with 42 U.S.C. §1981 and upheld Kamehameha's admissions policy.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should grant the Petition for Rehearing En Banc and reverse the majority decision of the three-judge panel. 
I. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission ("HCRC") is responsible for enforcing state laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and state-funded services. Hawai'i Revised Statutes ("HRS") Chapter 368, part I. HCRC exercises jurisdiction over complaints against public and private educational institutions as employers, operators of public accommodations, and operators of residential housing. 1 Hawai'i's civil rights laws arise from our state constitution, which provides that "[n]o person shall ... be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry." Haw. Const., art. I, § 5. This provision was adopted at the 1950 Constitutional Convention, by delegates with strong civil rights concerns stemming from personal experiences with de jure and de facto discrimination under Hawai'i's segregated, plantation past. See generally LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, HAWAII PONO: A SOCIAL HISTORY (1961).
Established in January 1991, HCRC has accepted/processed over 8,000 complaints of discrimination. HCRC has experience and expertise interpreting civil rights statutes, particularly with respect to employment, and is familiar with the burden-shifting analysis used to infer discriminatory intent. See, e.g., McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) . HCRC is also familiar with Native Hawaiian history. HCRC's understanding of these issues is based on 14 years of experience, investigation and research into Native Hawaiian history, Native Hawaiian rights litigation, the purpose and context of Native Hawaiian programs, as ' However, HCRC does not exercise jurisdiction over complaints of discrimination in public or private school education. Accordingly, it does not accept, investigate or administratively adjudicate complaints involving claims of discrimination in admissions, discipline, grading, or misconduct by or against students. [Volume 14:205 well as the history of discrimination and the civil rights movement in Hawai'i.
Among its powers and functions, HCRC is authorized to hold public hearings and issue publications that promote goodwill and minimize or eliminate discrimination. See HRS § § 363-3(2), (6). Shortly after its formation, HCRC convened a public conference in December 1991 to, inter alia, assess the status of civil rights in our State. See Declaration of John Ishihara; Exhibit A. One issue addressed was the relationship between civil rights and Native Hawaiian rights to self-determination. An expert legal panel testified that these rights are distinct. Native Hawaiians are indigenous people whose nation was overthrown by American interests, then annexed by the United States.
2 Native Hawaiians lost their government, lands, language, traditions and cultural practices, resulting in near extinction of their population and severe, continuing socioeconomic and educational deficits. 3 Recognizing this sad and unjust history, the federal and state governments entered into a special political relationship and trust obligation with Native Hawaiians (as a formerly sovereign and indigenous people), and established numerous programs to rehabilitate them. 4 In this context, the goal of remedial programs for Native Hawaiians is to restore self-determination, not equality.
In September 1993, HCRC also held public hearings on whether to expand its jurisdiction to include discrimination based on race, religion, sex or national origin in access to state and state-funded programs and services. See Declaration of John Ishihara, Exhibit B. Community members and legal experts testified concerning the effects of current and proposed state civil rights laws on restorative programs for Native Hawaiians. The speakers reiterated that these programs are based on Native Hawaiians' political status as indigenous peoples, not race. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Ahuna v. Dept. of Hawaiian Home Lands, 640 P.2d 1161 , 1167 -69 (Haw. 1982 .
Based on the history, legal authorities and analysis presented at the 1991 conference and 1993 public hearings, HCRC determined that restorative programs for Native Hawaiians neither implicate nor violate federal or state civil rights laws. I Id. at 1150-51.
4 Id. at 115 1-54. The State's recognition of Native Hawaiians' special status as indigenous people can be further found in constitutional and statutory provisions affirming and protecting the traditional and customary rights of Native Hawaiians, as well as those incorporating federal provisions expressly designated for the benefit of Native Hawaiians. Haw. Const. art. XII, §1-7, art. XV, § 4 & art. Xvi, § 7; HRS 1-1, 7-1. See also Act of March 18, 1959, Pub.L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4, § 4 and 5(f) (the "Admission Act").
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 1981 does not apply to this case. Restorative programs for Native Hawaiians, including Appellees' admissions policy, are based on the political status of Native Hawaiians as formerly sovereign, indigenous peoples to promote self-determination and self-governance.
Alternatively, because Appellees' admissions policy is not a racebased affirmative action program, standards for determining whether affirmative action programs constitute legitimate non-discriminatory 
III. ARGUMENT
A. SECTION 1981 DOES NOT APPLY
This case is about two very different histories, (1) a Hawaiian story of a Princess's bequest to her people, and (2) an American story of emancipated slaves, their descendants, and an ongoing struggle for equality. By forcing the first story into an analytical framework developed to remedy the second story, the panel majority created an absurd and unjust result.
Native Hawaiians' loss of nationhood, special political status and restorative programs established for them as indigenous people differ significantly from the history of discrimination addressed by civil rights laws. Native Hawaiian rights are distinct from civil rights claims, and must be analyzed accordingly.
First Story: A Legacy for Native Hawaiians
At her death in 1884, Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop (the last remaining direct heir of King Kamehameha I) left a gift of her lands to her people. The Princess was one of several royal heirs who left trusts for their people's benefit.'
These Ali'i (chiefs) acted out of concern for the survival of Native Hawaiians, whose population diminished from an estimated 400,000 to 1,000,000 people at the time of first contact, to fewer than 40,000 about one hundred years later. Sadly, their concerns and premonitions proved true in many respects. By 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom had been illegally overthrown. The United States later annexed the islands in 1898, turning Hawai'i into an American colony. 6 Hawaiians were dispossessed of their land, language and culture. By 1920, their population had fallen to 28,000.
Today, Native Hawaiians continue to suffer adverse effects due to "western influences." But" remedial efforts by Congress, the State, and private entities have provided hope and support. The Ali'i trusts (including Kamehameha Schools) remain a cornerstone of these efforts.
Second Story: The Struggle for Civil Rights in America
This is a uniquely American story involving several chapters: slavery, the Civil War and emancipation, reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the civil rights movement. Slavery has played a crucial role in our history, from conquistador enslavement of native peoples to the massive trade of African slaves. Our Founding Fathers incorporated and acknowledged the importance of slavery (and its economic/political significance) in the Constitution, counting slaves as 3/5ths of a person for representation purposes. But abolitionist activism coupled with strained economic relations between the industrial North and agricultural South, ultimately led to Civil War.
At the end of the Civil War, the U.S. Constitution was amended to outlaw slavery (13th Amendment), guarantee due process and equal protection (14th Amendment), and the right to vote (15th Amendment). In order to ensure the rights of freed men during post-war Reconstruction, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (including § 1981). But Reconstruction was compromised, then abandoned, giving rise to Jim Crow laws codifying segregation. The Reconstruction civil rights statutes were largely forgotten until revived during the modern Civil Rights Movement.
In the mid-1900's, America was forced to face the race and justice issues posed by segregation. This struggle was motivated by a desire for equality, integration and diversity, resulting in enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in employment. The Supreme Court developed its McDonnell-Douglas framework for proving Title VII discrimination and, subsequently, applied this test to § 1981 race discrimination claims in
B. RECONCILING THE TWO STORIES
These two stories-both sad, yet uplifting-are different, but can be reconciled. However, this lawsuit inappropriately focuses on application of legal standards--developed to ferret out and prove racial discrimination in the civil rights context-to a restorative program designed to address harms caused by denial of native rights. Hawaiians" is a political status, not a Resolution"). The Apology Resolution specifically acknowledges that the overthrow resulted in "the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people," and "the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination." It also demonstrates Congress's recognition that Native Hawaiians constitute a political group with legitimate claims to sovereignty and the right to selfdetermination.
"Native
Congress has further recognized Native Hawaiian political rights under a plethora of laws, including one supporting Native Hawaiian education programs. "The United States has recognized and reaffirmed that ... Congress does not extend services to Native Hawaiians because of their race, but because of their unique status as the indigenous people of a once sovereign nation as to whom the United States has established a trust relationship." 20 U.S.C. § 75 12(12). The import and significance of these federal laws were not properly considered by the majority panel, and this failure requires that the Court grant the petition for rehearing.
Based on the political status of Native Hawaiians, Appellees' admission policy does not constitute race discrimination under § 1981.
The affirmative action test does not apply to restorative
programs for formerly sovereign indigenous people.
Assuming that § 1981 analysis is appropriate, HCRC contends the Panel majority should not have applied the Weber/Johnson standards. As applied, the Title VII/ § 1981 analytical framework makes no sense here. Standards for considering whether affirmative action programs constitute legitimate non-discriminatory reasons do not fit, because Appellees' admissions policy is not a race-based affirmative action program. See, e.g., ' See 295 F.Supp. 2d at 115, 1-54 (citing multiple congressional enactments).
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